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NOTES
an interest of the United States, 2 it is highly improbable that a different
rule would obtain with respect to a state's marketable title act.
V. CONCLUSION
The Indiana Marketable Title Act does not guarantee a commercially
marketable title to a prospective grantor who has complied with the act,
nor was it intended to do so. The purpose of the act is simply to ex-
tinguish unpreserved pre-root of title interests which may cloud a title,
and its policy is to permit the settlement of opposing post-root of title in-
terests outside its scope.
The enactment of effective marketable title legislation is of great
significance for Indiana. "No other remedial legislation which has been
enacted or proposed in recent years for the improvement of conveyancing
offers as much as the [M]arketable [T]itle [A]ct. It may be regarded
as the keystone in the arch which constitutes the structure of a modern-
ized system of conveyancing."73  Depending primarily on two factors,
marketable title legislation may become as important in property law as
recording acts. The first of these is its success in facilitating land title
transactions through less expensive abstracting, more efficient title ex-
amination, and increased title security resulting from more uniform title
practices. If the Marketable Title Act achieves these objectives, it will
become an indispensable part of our property law. The second and most
important factor in determining the role of marketable title legislation in
Indiana is the extent to which it is accepted and used by practicing attor-
neys. Although problems necessitating changes in the act may arise,
they will be of no serious consequence if the bar continues to realize the
value of marketable title legislation while making the necessary changes.
However, if the bar reacts to these problems by throwing out the baby
with the bath water before the legislation has had a chance to prove itself,
inefficient conveyancing practices will continue.
DAMAGES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The National Labor Relations Board cannot award damages for un-
fair labor practices,' and the state and federal courts are severely limited
72. Northern Pacific Ry. v. McComas, 250 U.S. 387 (1919).
73. Sx Fs & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 3.
1. "The Labor Management Relations Act sets up no general compensatory pro-
cedure except in such minor supplementary ways as the reinstatement of wrongfully dis-
charged employees with back pay." United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U.S. 656, 665 (1953). See also 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958);
Labor Board v. Electrical Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
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in encroaching on labor policy by awarding damages for actions which
are within the domain of the NLRB. Traditional tort remedies, such as
interference with the contractual relation,2 now generally are pre-empted
by the Taft-Hartley Act if the interference involves an unfair labor prac-
tice.' Consequently, an employer may recoup losses resulting from what
Congress has determined to be unfair labor practices only through (1) ex-
ceptions to the pre-emption doctrine or (2) specific congressional provi-
sion, such as section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act.4 Sec-
tion 303 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purposes of this section only,
in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor
organization to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an
unfair labor practice in section 8 (b) (4) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of any violation of subsection (a) may sue therefor in
any district court of the United States subject to the limitations
and provisions of section 301 hereof without respect to the
amount in controversy, or any other court having jurisdiction
of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained
and the cost of the suit.
Section 303 clearly was meant to deter engaging in 8(b) (4) viola-
tions. Section 8(b) (4) proscribes activities involving secondary boy-
cotts, work assignment disputes, or hot cargo agreements. Also pro-
scribed is the encouragement of employees or the coercion of an em-
ployer in an effort to force an employer to recognize a union when an-
other is presently certified or to force an employer or self-employed per-
son to join any labor or employer organization. These are the only un-
fair labor practices for which Congress has specifically given the courts
jurisdiction to grant damages.
I. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES UNDER 303
Damages Necessary for a Right of Action
By its language section 303(b) creates a right of action in "(w) ho-
ever shall be injured in his business or property." The term "(w) hoever"
2. PRossER, TORTS, § 106 (2d ed. 1955).
3. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
4. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 303, 61 Stat. 158
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958), as amended, 73 Stat 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (Supp.
I, 1962). The 1959 amendment merely condensed the statute by making reference to
8(b) (4).
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is construed broadly by the courts to include anyone directly involved in
the labor dispute. This construction is consistent with the section's legis-
lative history and recognizes Congress' awareness of the broad coverage
of that phrase.' In accord with this construction, the Supreme Court re-
jected the argument that the statutory phrase should be construed so nar-
rowly as to protect only the neutral employer in secondary boycott cases'
and gave a right of action to the primary employer.
However, when an employer not directly involved in the labor con-
troversy seeks damages for loss of profits, the courts have given the
phrase a narrow construction. For example, in Osborne Mining Co. v.
United Mine Workers,' a sales agent of Osborne, the employer who was
the primary object of the union activities, sought to collect damages for
loss of comnmiissions it would have earned had Osborne filled its orders.
The court ruled these damages to be incidental and too remote for re-
covery, even though some of the union's activities were directed at the
sales agent and a breach of the contractual relationship between the
agency and Osborne was forced by the union.'
Courts in Osborne and at least one other case? have suggested that
section 303 is analogous to the damage provisions of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.'" Under the Sherman Act only those persons who are injured
directly may recover." This narrow construction of "injury" in anti-
trust cases results from a policy of limiting those entitled to recover the
treble damages penalty.' This policy is consistent with the doctrine that
penal statutes are to be interpreted strictly," but section 303 is not a penal
statute. It is remedial and the policy considerations of the anti-trust
statutes are not applicable.
5. 93 CONG. REc. 4872-73 (1947) (remarks by Senators Morse and Taft). See also
Brick Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1952).
6. Id. at 643-44. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S.
534, 543 (1940).
7. 279 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 881 (1960).
8. Id. at 729.
9. Brick Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1952).
10. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1959).
11. See, e.g., Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Products Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679
(2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1955).
12. The courts feel that only those who are the direct object of the anti-trust viola-
tion should be entitled to the recovery of this penalty. Snow Crest Beverage v. Recipe
Foods, 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956) ; Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc.,
193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1952). They have been "reluctant to allow those who were not in
direct competition with the defendant to have a private action even though, as a matter
of logic, their losses were foreseeable." Snow Crest Beverage v. Recipe Foods at 909.
13. Prussian v. United States, 282 U.S. 675 (1931). "The term 'penal' has been
given wide and varying meaning. It may apply to 'fines and imprisonments' only, it may
extend to certain 'civil' recoveries." 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 3303
(3rd ed. Horack 1943).
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More analogous to actions under section 303 than the actions under
anti-trust statutes are suits for intentional interference with a contractual
relationship. Under the standards applied to determine who has a right
of action for intentional interference with a contract, a plaintiff not
directly involved in a labor dispute, such as a sales agent of the employer,
could recover if knowledge by the union of the plaintiff's interest is estab-
lished and the union acts with the desire and purpose of interfering with
the contract. 4 If this standard had been applied in Osborne the sales
agency likely would have recovered, since the union had knowledge of the
sales agent's contract and intentionally prevented its fulfillment. It
seems that the courts, in determining whether damage is sufficiently direct
to permit recovery, should look to the union's knowledge of the damage
it will cause by engaging in an unfair labor practice prohibited by
8(b) (4).
Even now an exception to the narrow construction rule of no dam-
ages for parties not directly involved in the labor dispute is made for an
employer whose physical property is damaged, and such an employer need
not be a party to the labor dispute. For example, in Gilchrest v. United
Mine Workers5 the plaintiff merely had leased coal mines and mining
equipment to the party who was the direct object of the union's illegal ac-
tivities. Plaintiff's facilities were damaged by dynamiting, and the coal
business, from which it received a percentage, was disrupted and de-
stroyed. It recovered both for the damage to physical property and for
the loss of business resulting from equipment damage.
It is difficult to see why contract losses should not be treated in the
same way as physical property damage. In Osborne, the selling agent's
right to commissions on a contract it had secured was just as much the
object of union attack as was the physical property in Gilchrest. The
union did everything it could to prevent the selling agent from collecting
on his contract right, and that right was just as valuable to him as the
physical property was to Gilchrest. Neither party had a dispute with the
union, and both the contract right and the mining equipment were de-
stroyed because the union had committed unfair labor practices against
third persons. A distinction between destruction of physical property and
destruction of intangible property as a grounds for granting recovery
under 303 seems false, and it seems that a right of recovery should be per-
mitted to all who suffer damage that proximately results from the union's
illegal activities. The legislative history of the act, which indicates that
14. See, e.g., PROSSER, ToRTs, § 106 (2d ed. 1955).
15. 290 F.2d 36 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961). See also, Local
978, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Marklvell, 305 F.2d 38, 47 (8th Cir. 1962).
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section 303 is to be a further deterrent to the proscribed illegal activity,'0
is consistent with and supports the adoption of the proposition that no
limitation other than that provided by common law should be imposed.
Employees seeking to recover damages under section 303 for con-
tract interference are met with arguments fundamentally different from
those invoked against the employer. The right of an employee to recover
contract interference damages was recognized in Wells v. International
Union of Operating Engineers7 in which the court was asked whether it
had jurisdiction to hear the claims of individual plaintiffs, who were
employees of the employer principally involved in the secondary boycott.
After finding that one of the purposes of the illegal activity was to secure
a breach of contract by the employer with the plaintiff employees, the
court held that employees were within the language of the act permitting
"(w)hoever" is injured to sue. However, cases where an employee's job
was terminated because his employer was forced by an unfair labor prac-
tice to shut down must be distinguished from cases where an employee
was discharged by the employer because of the insistence of his union.
In Seely v. Brotherhood of Painters8 the court held that a union which
forced an employer to discharge an employee did not violate that part of
the secondary boycott proscription which makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for a labor organization to force any person to cease doing business
with another person. Although there appeared to be an 8(b) (2) viola-
tion, the employee was not permitted to recover because there was no
secondary boycott. Seely was misinterpreted in the recent case of Gibbs
v. United Mine Workers.9 Gibbs was an employee of both a mine opera-
tor and an independent contractor which hauled coal from the mine. The
court awarded damages to Gibbs under 303 for the loss of his trucking
contract because the facts constituted a secondary boycott, but an award
of damages for the loss of his employment contract was set aside on the
gTound that forcing the discharge of Gibbs was not a secondary boycott.'0
Seely cannot serve as authority for the Gibbs decision, however. In Gibbs
there definitely was a secondary boycott without regard to the termination
of Gibb's employment, but in Seely there was no secondary boycott what-
ever and consequently no basis for a cause of action under 303. The
Seely case is authority only for the proposition that the discharge of an
16. 93 CONG. REc. 4858 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
17. 303 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1962).
18. 308 F.2d 52, 60 (5th Cir. 1962).
19. 220 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
20. Damages were sustained for the loss of the employment contract as a result of
the common-law conspiracy, though denied under § 303. Id. at 878. It seems that
such an award should have been prevented by the pre-emption doctrine laid down in
Garnon. See text accompanying note 61 infra.
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employee does not constitute a secondary boycott and clearly is not
authority for precluding recovery by an employee where there was in fact
a secondary boycott. Gibbs should have been allowed to recover under
section 303 for the loss of both the trucking contract and the employment.
Once it is established that the plaintiff, be he employer or employee,
has a right of recovery the general rules for determining the amount of
damages apply.2 When the legal and illegal activities are so interrelated
as to be inseparable, the plaintiff may total the union's efforts and re-
cover for the full damage.22 Lost profits are recoverable where there is
an established and stable business and they can be proved with reasonable
certainty,2" even though they are approximate; but they may not be de-
termined by mere speculation or guess.2" It therefore has been held that
if the employer-plaintiff has established a profitable business with his
customers or lessor, his future profits are not speculative and may be
recovered 5 if there is a desire on the part of both parties to continue the
business relationship.2
21. A union will be held responsible for all damages which are the direct and
proximate result of the proscribed conduct. Local 978, United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
Markwell, 305 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1962). An employer is entitled to the cost of hiring
guards and moving equipment as a protective measure. Blair v. UMW, 211 F. Supp. 786
(E.D. Ky. 1962). The general rule is that attorney's fees ordinarily cannot be recovered.
However, attorney's fees for bringing about the removal of an unlawful picket line and
for filing a charge with the NLRB to bring about the removal of the picket line are
proper items of damage. Local 984, Teamsters Union v. Humko Co., 287 F.2d 231, 242
(6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961). The jury also should take into ac-
count that the employer is under a duty to minimize his injury, exercising due diligence
and sound business judgment. Curto v. International Longshoremen's Union, 107 F.
Supp. 805 (D.C. Ore. 1952), aff'd 226 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1955).
22. UMW v. Osborne Mining Co., 279 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied 364
U.S. 881 (1960). See also, NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S.
675 (1951); Carpenters Union v. Cisco Constr. Co., 266 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 828 (1959). But damages resulting from a lawful strike at an-
other plant of the same employer, separate from the illegal activities, are not recoverable.
See Local 984, Teamsters Union v. Humko Co., 287 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 962 (1961).
23. See, e.g., UMW v. Osborne Mining Co., 279 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. de-
nied, 364 U.S. 881 (1960); Baumer v. Franklin County Distillery Co., 135 F.2d 384
(6th Cir. 1943).
24. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
In Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Union, 257 N.C. 18, 30, 125 S.E.2d 277, 286
(1962), the plaintiff relied on the testimony of its vice-president, who was qualified as
an expert in cost accounting, to prove its actual damages. This was held to be a proper
basis upon which the jury could make its decision. Cf. Gibbs v. UMNV, 220 F. Supp. 871
(E.D. Tenn. 1963), where plaintiff's own evidence of his lost profits was held not to be
creditable.
25. UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742, 748 (4th Cir. 1954). But see Deena Products
Co. v. United Brick Workers, 195 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1952), where the court held that a
parent corporation cannot recover damages under the act where its subsidiary was the
primary employer and was involved in a dispute with a union which developed into a
secondary boycott. There was, however, no contract between the parent and subsidiary.
26. Dairy Distributors, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 8 Utah 2d 124, 329 P.2d 414
(1958). If plaintiffs are prevented from entering into a contract or lease with a cus-
NOTES
Liability of Possible Defendants
Liability for section 303 violations must be considered from three
principal viewpoints: (1) member and officer responsibility, (2) local
union responsibility, and (3) international union responsibility. Though
the three overlap, each involves problems different from the others.
Generally speaking, judgments are not enforceable against indi-
vidual union members or officers or their assets but only against a labor
organization." However, state jurisdiction to enforce criminal penalties
and common-law tort liabilities against individuals has not been abolished
by the federal labor acts but only limited to instances where there was vio-
lence or criminal conduct.2 8  In Curto v. International Longshoremen's
Union,2" the jury awarded damages against the international and local
unions but absolved the individual defendants from liability even though
their activity involved violence. Since a union is liable for the unlawful
acts of its officers and agents when they have committed some tortious
act under a state law which has not been pre-empted, it appears that there
was an inconsistency in the verdict, especially in light of the fact that the
agents appeared to be conspiring with the union to tortiously destroy their
employer's goods." It seems the officers should have been held liable
under state common law, but since the union's liability is determined un-
der federal statute, it was the prerogative of the jury to be inconsistent."
Liability of the local union, whether it be for a 303 violation or an
unfair labor practice charge, must be based on something other than mis-
tomer because of unlawful union activity, profits which would have been derived from
that contract are recoverable. However, the jury must first determine that the failure
of concluding the contract was the direct and proximate result of the union activity.
UAIW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954).
27. Section 301, which is applicable to § 303 suits, provides that a labor or-
ganization may be sued as an entity "in the courts of the United States." Suit therefore
should be brought under the union's name and not the name of its president. Schinella v.
Iron Workers, 149 F. Supp. 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). Most plaintiffs, however, join several
members of the local, sometimes using fictitious names, as representatives of the organi-
zation as a whole. This has the effect of bringing all members of the union into court.
When an action involves both state and federal charges, the joinder of members may be
required. Bunch v. Launius, 222 Ark. 760, 262 S.W.2d 461 (1953). Joinder of members
is permissible in 303 cases even though the union is not considered by the state a jural
entity subject to suit. Flame Coal Co. v. UMXW, 303 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 891 (1963). See also Labor Management Relations Act § 301(b), 61 Stat. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1958).
28. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) ; International Long-
shoreman's Union v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 226 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1955). See also
White Oak Coal Co., v. UAIW, 318 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 966
(1964).
29. 107 F. Supp. 805 (D.C. Ore. 1952).
30. International Longshoremen's Union v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 226 F.2d 875,
884 (9th Cir. 1955).
31. Id. at 881.
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conduct by the rank and file." The union will be held responsible only
for the unlawful acts of its agents acting in the course and scope of their
employment; and consequently, the problems common to agency law will
arise here."3 If a union puts or lets an officer or other representative get
into a position where he can and does cause conduct proscribed by the act,
the union is liable." The union agent or representative who is respons-
ible for the unlawful activity may be either a union officer named as an
individual defendant or officials or agents who are not made parties to
the suit."3 The liability of labor organizations for unlawful acts of of fi-
cers or members is covered by section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
which requires clear proof of responsibility to establish liability."' Al-
though there once was case law requiring actual instigation, participation,
or ratification to establish responsibility, 7 section 301 (e)," which gov-
32. International Longshoremen's Union v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 226 F.2d 875
(9th Cir. 1955).
33. See, e.g., White Oak Coal Co. v. UMW, 318 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. de-
nied, 375 U.S. 966 (1964) (scope of employment); UMW v. Osborne Mining Co., 279
F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 881 (1960) (authorization) ; UMW v.
Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959)(authorization, ratification); UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. de-
nied, 348 U.S. 824 (1954) (authorization, ratification).
34. See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Union v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 226
F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Structural Steel & Ornamental Iron Ass'n v. Shopmen's Local
545, 172 F. Supp. 354 (D.N.J. 1959); Dairy Distributors, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 8
Utah 2d 124, 329 P.2d 414 (1958). But see United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking
Co., 223 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
Even though such unlawful acts were not actually authorized or were forbidden,
union responsibility may be found if the acts were done by the agent in the scope of his
employment and in furtherance of the union's business. Curto v. International Long-
shoremen's Union, 107 F. Supp. 805 (D.Ore. 1952), aff'd 226 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1955)(jury instruction). Custom or traditional practice of a particular union may be con-
sidered in determining scope of employment. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States,
330 U.S. 395, 410 (1947). Actual authorization is not necessary. Lewis v. Benedict
Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 905 (1959),
modified, 361 U.S. 459 (1960).
35. International Longshoremen's Union v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 226 F.2d 875
(9th Cir. 1955).
36. Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or
organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held re-
sponsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts
of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual
participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such
acts after actual knowledge thereof.
47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958). In United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United
States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947), this statute was construed to require clear proof of re-
sponsibility in establishing liability for damages or imputation of guilt.
37. See United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947).
38. Section 301(e) provides:
For purposes of this section in determining whether any person is acting as the
"agent" of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his
acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually author-
NOTES
erns recovery under section 303(b)," has been construed to restore the
general rules of agency, including the doctrine of apparent authority, to
303 (b) actions."0
While union constitutions usually give the international sufficient
control over a local to establish a principal-agent relationship,4' this power
of control is not by itself sufficient to make the international liable.42
The courts normally discuss the liability of the international in agency
terms; but it appears that liability really is not determined by a strict ap-
plication of common-law agency doctrines but rather by application of a
standard specially suited to the equities of labor cases. In the opinions
considered, contrary to agency doctrine, courts apparently would not make
an international union liable for what it might have done but only for
what it did. 3 It appears that the international must itself be involved in
the illegal activity. In one type of case the international's involvement
takes the form of direction, encouragement, or assistance of illegal ac-
tivity. In another more common type of case representatives of the in-
ternational actually participate in the illegal activity.45
ized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
39. Section 303(b) provides: "whoever is injured . . . may sue . . . subject to
the limitations and provisions of section 301. .. ."
40. International Longshoremen's Union v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 226 F.2d 875
(9th Cir. 1955). In his analysis of the bill Senator Taft had the following to say: "It
is true that this definition [in § 301(e)] was written to avoid the construction which the
Supreme Court in the recent case of United States v. United Bhd. of Carpenters placed
upon section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act which exempts organizations from liability
for illegal acts committed in labor disputes unless proof of actual instigation, participa-
tion, or ratification can be shown. . . . The conferees agreed that the ordinary law of
agency should apply to union representatives. . . . Union business agents or stewards,
acting in their capacity of union officers, may make their union guilty of an unfair labor
practice . . . even though no formal action has been taken by the union to authorize or
approve such conduct." 93 CONG. REc. 7001 (1947).
41. See, e.g., Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Union, 257 N.C. 18, 125 S.E.2d
277 (1962).
42. See, e.g., UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); United Constr.
Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847
(1955) ; Mile Branch Coal Co. v. UMW, 162 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1958).
43. United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
44. See, e.g., UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
824 (1954); Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Union, 257 N.C. 18, 125 S.E.2d 277
(1962).
45. See, e.g., Flame Coal Co. v. UMW, 303 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 891 (1963) ; Local 984, Teamsters Union v. Humko Co., 287 F.2d 231 (6th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961); UMW v. Osborne Mining Co., 279 F.2d 716
(6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 881 (1960) ; UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263
F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
II. JURISDICTION OF DAMAGE SUITS
Statutory Provisions
State and federal courts are given concurrent jurisdiction to enforce,
by way of damages, the rights created by section 303."4 In federal dis-
trict courts, the jurisdictional requirements are relaxed to a great extent
because one of the announced objectives of 303 was the elimination of
obstacles to suits." The act specifically grants jurisdiction to federal
courts to hear 303 suits "without respect to the amount in controversy."4
The only limitation to this is the de minimis doctrine,4" which goes also to
the effect on interstate commerce. For example, in Groneman v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Elec. Workers,"0 the activities involved were primarily
local, and out of state purchases caused an interruption of interstate
commerce only to the extent of $6,000. The district court was held
to be without jurisdiction because the impact was so "trifling and micro-
scopic" that Congress did not intend to regulate such acts. The National
Labor Relations Act seeks to prevent disturbances to interstate commerce
resulting from strikes and labor disputes induced or likely to be induced
46. 61 Stat. 158(b) (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1958). See also Schatte v. Inter-
national Alliance, Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950), rehearing
denied, 183 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950), rehearing denied,
340 U.S. 885 (1950).
47. International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 244
(1952). Assuming a violation of § 8(b) (4) is alleged, the one jurisdictional re-
quirement, whether the suit be brought in a federal or state court, is that interstate com-
merce be affected. The courts have held that in enacting the National Labor Relations
Act Congress meant to reach the full extent of its powers under the commerce clause.
Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1, 3 (1957). The commerce power extends to the
protection of interstate commerce from interference by activities which are wholly intra-
state. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 605 (1938). Thus, businesses which, by them-
selves, would be purely local, might be considered to affect interstate commerce when
all of their purchases or sales out of state are considered together. It is immaterial that
the out of state purchase or sale does not relate to the labor dispute, because "the inter-
state commerce intended to be protected by the Act is not confined to the particular job
but extends to all of the activities of the employer." Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v.
Bricklayers Union, 263 F2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 904 (1959).
It is only necessary to allege the value of goods purchased outside the state for the 12-
month period next preceding the filing of the action. Ibid. See also Tampa Sand &
Material Co. v. Bricklayers Union, 263 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1959). The broad coverage
of § 303 is based on an interpretation of the statutory language which makes the
proscribed conduct unlawful "in an industry or activity affecting commerce." Cone Bros.
Contracting Co. v. Bricklayers Union, supra. When a secondary boycott is the unfair
labor practice alleged, the jurisdictional requirement is met if either the primary or sec-
ondary employer is engaged in an industry affecting commerce. Hattiesburg Bldg. &
Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126 (1964).
48. Labor Management Relations Act § 303(b), 61 Stat. 158(b) (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 187(b) (1958). See also United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347
U.S. 656, 666 (1953).
49. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1938).
50. 177 F.2d 995, 997 (10th Cir. 1949).
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by unfair labor practices. 1 In light of this objective, activities which are
primarily local and which involve the purchase of only a small percentage
of out-of-state materials are not within the scope of section 303.
The consensus appears to be that diversity of citizenship is not neces-
sary to the jurisdiction of the federal courts under section 303.2 How-
ever, one court has held to the contrary. In Lad v. Engineers Local,"3
the contention was made and accepted that diversity is required, the rul-
ing being based on a reading of 303 in conjunction with section 301 (a)
of the Labor Management Relations Act, which deals with suits for vio-
lation of contracts between unions and employers. Section 301 confers
jurisdiction "without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties," while Section 303 provides that
an action may be brought in district court "without regard to the amount
in controversy." Thus by negative implication, section 303 requires the
existence of diversity of citizenship. United Brick Workers v. Deena
Artware" points out, however, that section 303 "creates new substantive
rights and liabilities together with an appropriate remedy for their en-
forcement, and that an action under it clearly arises under a law of the
United States within the meaning of section 1331, Title 28 of U. S. Code,
and under an Act of Congress regulating commerce within the meaning
of section 1337, Title 28 U. S. Code, both of which sections grant juris-
diction to the district courts without requiring diversity of citizenship."
Both section 301 and section 303 were enacted by the same Congress at
the same time-1947-and there is no apparent reason why there should
be different jurisdiction requirements for the two remedies.
State Court Jurisdiction of Tort Damage Claims
Generally, jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board super-
sedes that of state courts in cases in which the activity that is the subject
matter of the litigation is arguably within section 7 or 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act." Exceptions to this rule are made,"6 however; and
51. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 604 (1938).
52. Labor Management Relations Act § 303(b), 61 Stat. 158(b) (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 187(b) (1958).
53. 86 F. Supp. 463 (D. Mass. 1949).
54. 198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1952).
55. See, e.g., La Cross Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U.S. 18 (1949) ; Schatte v. International Alliance, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950) ;
California Ass'n of Employers v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 178 F.2d 175 (9th
Cir. 1949) ; Amazon Cotton M1ill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.
1948). These cases hold that the federal and state courts are generally pre-empted by
the NLRB.
56. In addition to § 303, the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)
§ 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958), permits an employer or a labor or-
ganization to prosecute a breach of the collective bargaining contract, even though the
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chief among them is the recognition of state court jurisdiction in matters
involving the maintenance of domestic peace.r The fact that a violation
of domestic peace also constitutes an unfair labor practice does not pro-
hibit the state courts from granting relief.9 Until recently, however, it was
not clear that a threat to domestic peace was necessary to circumvent the
pre-emption doctrine. 9 It was thought that perhaps all state common
law and statutory rights were enforceable' ° without regard to the pres-
ence or absence of violence. Whether courts could act in non-violent
tort cases was clarified somewhat in the Supreme Court case of San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon.0  In that case, a California court
had held that the union activities which constituted unfair labor practices
were a tort under state law and the general tort provisions of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code."2 The United States Supreme Court granted certi-
orari 3 to determine whether the California court had jurisdiction to
award damages arising out of peaceful union activity. The California
decision was reversed, and state court jurisdiction was denied. To mini-
mize areas of potential conflict, the jurisdiction of state courts was limited
to cases in which the conduct constituting the unfair practices involved
intimidation and threats of violence. 4 States must have power to pre-
breach concededly involves an unfair labor practice. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195, 197 (1962). Because § 301 does not involve the collection of damages solely
for the commission of an unfair labor practice, it does not come within the scope of this
paper.
57. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1958);
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937).
58. See, e.g., White Oak Coal Co. v. UMW, 318 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1963), ccrt. de-
nied, 375 U.S. 966 (1964) ; UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
59. The Labor Management Relations Act "leaves much to the states though Con-
gress has refrained from telling how much." Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485,
488 (1953).
60. In United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1953),
the Supreme Court allowed a state court to award compensatory and punitive damages
where the union had used violence and intimidated officers and employees of the plaintiff
to achieve a prohibited objective. Such activity on the part of the union had required the
abandonment of all the employer's projects in the area. This union conduct constituted
a violation of section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act and was a
ground for state common-law tort action based on violence and intimidation. The Su-
preme Court allowed recovery on the common-law tort theory, reasoning that "the state
remedy had no effective counter-part." The Court said, "For us to cut off the injured
respondent from this right of recovery will deprive it of its property without recourse
of compensation. To do so will, in effect, grant petitioners immunity from liability for
their tortious conduct." Id. at 664. Though the facts of the Laburnum case show violent
activity on the part of the union, the ruling of the case implied that all state common-
law liabilities can be prosecuted by the employer without regard to the interest of the
state in the "maintenance of domestic peace." See generally Wollett, State Power to
Regulate Labor Relations, 33 WASH. L. REV. 364 (1958).
61. 359 U.S. 236 (1958).
62. Id. at 239.
63. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 357 U.S. 925 (1958).
64. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 248 n. 6 (1958).
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serve domestic tranquility when there is no clear congressional mandate
to the contrary. The National Labor Relations Act does not take away
this state power over violent conduct since the act does not provide an
adequate substitute. The procedures outlined in the act are not designed
to control violence or to provide effective sanctions such as punitive dam-
ages. On the other hand, when there is no violence, there is no com-
pelling need for state action.
In addition, Congress provided a compensatory remedy in section
303 for unfair labor practices arising under section 8(b) (4) because it
was felt that secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes were particu-
larly indefensible forms of union activity.6" It is consistent with the
national labor policy, which is designed to promote free collective bargain-
ing, that damages should be allowed only for the unfair labor practices
specified in section 303. Allowing the courts to go outside 303 and com-
pensate for losses due to other unfair labor practices might hamper free
collective bargaining and would therefore present at least a potential con-
flict with the national labor relations policy. "6 This potential conflict is
not present when there is violence, as Congress has not dealt with vio-
lence in a way adequate to protect the state's interest. In sum, a state or
federal court may adjudicate activities involving an unfair labor practice
and grant damages when the activities are so violent that the state must
act to preserve its domestic peace. Otherwise, in labor matters covered
by the National Labor Relations Act a court may only act where Con-
gress specifically has permitted.
Joinder of 303 and State Causes of Action
Because only actual damages sustained may be recovered under 303"7
for an 8(b) (4) violation, the award of punitive damages or grant of an
injunction must be based on violation of a joined state statutory or com-
mon law aimed at preserving the public order.6" The state action is sepa-
rate from the federal right, but joinder of the two is allowed.69
If jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, there is no ques-
65. "Further, I think the threat of a suit for damages is a tremendous deterrent to
the institution of secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes. I may say that, so far
as I know, no defense of this kind of strike was made throughout the testimony. There
was a suggestion that there was some kind of 'good' secondary boycott, but no one was
ever able to point to it and to say what it was." 93 CONG. REc. 5060 (1947) (remarks of
Senator Taft).
66. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1953).
67. International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce, 189 F.2d 177, 189 (9th
Cir. 1951), aff'd, 342 U.S. 237 (1952). See generally, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGE-MENT RELATIONS AcT 1323-1400.
68. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1958).
69. Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Union, 257 N.C. 18, 125 S.E.2d (1962).
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tion that the federal court could hear and determine the joined common-
law liability, if not pre-empted, and possibly grant punitive damages.7
However, when there is no diversity of citizenship, a question arises as to
the propriety of joining a federal and non-federal cause of action. Re-
cently, in United Mine Workers v. Meadow Creek Coal Co.,71 it was held
that when there is a section 303 question presented, the federal and non-
federal questions are based on substantially the same facts, and the fed-
eral and non-federal claims are only different grounds for a single cause
of action based on wrongful interference with the plaintiff's business, the
district court has jurisdiction of the non-federal claim. In sum, when a
federal question is substantially presented, the federal court may take
jurisdiction and resolve all questions of law based on the facts which
raise the federal question. This is an example of ancillary jurisdiction.
Under this rule, when the section 303 claim is dismissed on its merits, the
district court may still retain jurisdiction of the joined state cause of ac-
tion if the federal question is not plainly lacking in substance."' How-
ever, when the plaintiff's asserted federal cause of action is frivolous or
insubstantial the district court cannot retain the case and administer the
cause of action under the common law of the state." Unless there is jur-
isdiction based on diversity of citizenship the plaintiff must institute a
new suit in the state court.
In almost all instances where a state cause of action has been joined
with the section 303 suit, there has been violence involved and joinder was
for the purpose of obtaining punitive damages. But in the recent case of
Morton v. Local 2o, Teamsters Union,74 an award of punitive damages
was based on a secondary boycott made unlawful by state law. The court
of appeals ruled that such punitive damages were permissible even
though there was no violence involved. It was contended that a distinc-
tion should be made between violent and non-violent activity, but the
court refused to recognize the distinction.75 The Supreme Court reversed
70. See, e.g., UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
71. Id. at 59.
72. Id. at 60. In Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909),
where the trial court acquired jurisdiction by reason of the federal questions involved, the
court "had the right to decide all the questions in the case, even though it decided the fed-
eral questions adversely to the party raising them, or even if it omitted to decide them at
all, but decided the case on local or state questions only."
73. UMW v. Osborne Mining Co, 279 F.2d 716, 729 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 881 (1960).
74. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
75. Ibid. The lower court's decision also was based on the case of Hum v. Oursler,
289 U.S. 238 (1933), where the Supreme Court ruled that a federal court may dispose
of all issues arising from the facts constituting the federal action. But in that case
there was no conflict with federal law as is presented by the state statute in Mortons and
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because the court of appeals overlooked the point that a joinder of a
state cause of action based on violence is permitted because the state could
have acted when there was violence and not otherwise."8 There is no
reason to prohibit joinder of such a cause of action. However, when the
state cause of action does not involve the maintenance of domestic peace
but is based solely on a state secondary boycott statute, there is ample rea-
son for disallowing the joinder and precluding the recovery of punitive
damages. By allowing such a joinder and, consequently, punitive dam-
ages, a conflict with national labor relations policy is presented. The na-
tional labor policy, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is to grant ex-
clusive jurisdiction of labor matters to the National Labor Relations
Board with the courts acting only in such instances and manner as the
act specifically states."' Section 8(b) (4) violations present one instance
where courts may act, but the courts are limited to awarding actual dam-
ages sustained. Congress could have made provisions for treble damages,
as in anti-trust violations, but it was not so inclined. To have allowed
joinder of the state cause of action in Morton, with no overpowering rea-
son such as the exercise of the state's power to maintain peace, would
have circumvented the national labor policy of allowing only actual dam-
ages. The state secondary boycott statute is not necessary to the pro-
tection of citizens or maintenance of domestic peace and is merely a dis-
ruption of national labor policy.
To sum up, a state common-law or statutory cause of action may be
joined with the section 303 suit in order to obtain the advantage of puni-
tive damages or an injunction. Such a joinder should, however, be lim-
ited to only those instances where the state common law or statutory
cause of action could have been brought in the state court. Otherwise,
states will be able to circumvent the national labor policy by allowing
punitive damages where none were intended.
Removal to Federal Courts
Theoretically there should be no advantage to removing a 303 case.
Except when domestic peace is involved, both state and federal courts are
precluded from awarding punitive damages by the wording of section 303
so there was no reason to prevent the complete disposition of the case by disposing of a
state claim. Otherwise, the parties would have had to start a new action in a state
court. The Supreme Court was therefore correct in reversing and denying a joinder
since no new action could have been instituted because the state courts would be pre-
empted. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
76. But see Blair v. UMiW, 211 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Ky. 1962), where punitive
damages were recovered when the complaint alleged a purposeful invasion of the plain-
tiff's rights based upon a § 303 violation and an interference with contractual rights
under the common law of the state.
77. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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which expressly limits damages to those actually sustained." With the
same exception, federal courts also are precluded by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act 9 from granting an injunction; and a state court injunction is pre-
empted by the National Labor Relations Act."0 State courts, however,
are inclined to be more liberal in allowing injunctions and injunctions
pendente lite, because they seem either less likely to find interstate com-
merce affected or more likely to overlook or rule against pre-emption."
State courts also will permit a state cause of action to be joined for the
purpose of punitive damages more readily than will federal courts.82
Because of this state court liberality, removal to a federal court takes
on some importance.8"
When a case is removed because damages and an injunction are
sought, and the damage claim is later deleted by amendment, thereby re-
moving any basis for jurisdiction, a question arises as to whether a mo-
tion for remand should be granted. If the amount recoverable is reduced
below the jurisdictional minimum after institution of a suit in a federal
court, the court's jurisdiction is not ousted. 4 However, one court which
78. Section 303(a) expressly provides that the aggrieved party "shall recover the
damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit" Punitive damages are awarded up-
on the theory of punishment rather than compensation. See, e.g., Washington Gas Light
Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534 (1899). The clear intention of Congress is only to com-
pensate the plaintiff for the amount of actual damages and no more. UMW v. Patton,
211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954). The act does not contemplate injunctive relief. "It is
clear that Congress did not intend, either by expression or by necessary implication, that
private parties should have a right to injunctive relief even as an ancillary remedy in the
permitted suit for damages." Longshoreman's Union v. Sunset Line & Twine Co., 77
F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Calif. 1948).
79. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1956).
80. State and federal courts may enjoin activity which also constitutes an unfair
labor practice only when such activity is of a violent nature. UAW v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
81. See e.g., Lion Oil Co. v. Marsh, 229 Ark. 678, 249 S.W.2d 509 (1952).
82. See, e.g., Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Union, 257 N.C. 18, 125 S.E.2d 277
(1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962), rehearing denied, 371 U.S. 899 (1962).
83. The language of 303(b) reasonably lends itself to the interpretation that Con-
gress intended that a party be permitted to prosecute his suit to its final adjudication in
a state court if he so chooses. The act expressly gives the plaintiff a choice of where he
may sue. An interpretation which would permit removal solely because a federal ques-
tion was involved would make the words "or in any other court of competent jurisdic-
tion" meaningless. In such a case, the real choice of forum would be left to the de-
fendant, a result which, arguably, Congress did not intend. Considering these factors,
and the fact that district courts, in general, interpret jurisdictional requirements strictly,
removal of 303 cases in the future might be denied except in diversity cases. When
damages or damages and an injunction are sought in state court there is no question as
to the appropriateness of removal, assuming a 303 case can be removed. Douglas v.
Electric Workers, 136 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Mich. 1955). When only an injunction is
sought in the state court, however, problems arise as to the propriety of removal to a
federal court. See Note, Employer Remedies for Breach of No-Strike Clauses, 39 IND.
L.J. 387, 391 (1964), for a discussion of removal of 301 suits.
84. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
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had held that jurisdiction was not ousted 5 later seemed to doubt this
holding in a similar situation, saying, "the action is not one of which
the federal district courts have original jurisdiction, (and) . . the
cause should accordingly have been remanded to the (state court). '""8
The case, however, involved only an injunction, and remand has been
denied where damages and an injunction were joined."7 It would seem
that denial of remand is the logical course. Since federal law pre-
empts state court injunctions, a remand would be meaningless, for
the state court would have to dismiss under the Garmon doctrine.8"
However, it is submitted that if a case is brought in the state court and
only an injunction is sought, it should not be removed but be left to the
state court to dismiss if dismissal is required."a
III. MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
Service of Process
Service of summons or other legal process upon an officer or agent
of a labor organization, in his official capacity, constitutes service upon
the labor organization." When the international and local are separate,
autonomous entities, service of summons upon a local officer is not serv-
ice upon the international unless the international grants the officer the
authority to hold himself out as an official organizer, representative, or
agent of the international. Local unions or state and area conferences
are autonomous if they have "constitutional authority to govern them-
selves and to transact business through their own duly elected agents and
representatives."'" This is true even though the international may exer-
cise very strong control over its locals. However, courts have held that
service of process on a regional director is valid service on an "agent" of
the union "in his capacity as such," within the meaning of section 301 (d).
Service may also be made upon the secretary of state in the state in
85. Direct Transit Lines v. Local 406, Teamsters Union, 199 F.2d 89 (6th Cir.
1952).
86. Direct Transit Lines v. Starr, 219 F.2d 699, 700 (6th Cir. 1955). See also Hat
Corp. v. Hatters Union, 114 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1953) ; Department Stores Service,
Inc. v. John Doe, 98 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. N.Y. 1951).
87. See, e.g., Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Grand Rapids Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun-
cil, 22 L.C. 67,071 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
88. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
89. Such was implied in Direct Transit Lines N% Local 406, Teamsters Union, 219
F.2d 699, 700 (6th Cir. 1955).
90. UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 1013 (1959); Claycraft Co. v. UMW, 204 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1953).
91. Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 268 F.2d 871, 875 (7th Cir.
1959) ; Farnsworth & Chambers Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers, 125 F. Supp. 830 (D. N.M.
1954). Cf. Claycraft Co. v. UMV, 204 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1953), which was distinguished
because the district union was found to have no constitution and was wholly dependent on
the international.
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which the dispute took place, if the state statute so provides."
Statutes of Limitations
Assuming the union is found liable under 303, a question may arise
concerning what, if any, statute of limitations to apply. The court in
Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engineers,0
a 301 case, denied the union's motion to dismiss under a three-year Califor-
nia statute of limitations.94 This reasoning is based on the logic of Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills93 which construes section 301 to allow a uni-
form federal interpretation of contract terms to be applied rather than
the numerous meanings that would be applied in different jurisdictions.
The Fischbach, court concluded that only the equitable doctrine of laches
would be applicable.
By so holding, the California district court did not follow the line
of cases which have applied state statutes of limitations to other federal
statutes, including the Fair Labor Standards Act,96 the Civil Rights Act,9"
and anti-trust statutes.9" "The adoption of state statutes seems so well
established that the failure to designate a limitation period has been said
to indicate a congressional intention that state law be applied."99  The
federal court's decision to apply federal substantive law in Lincoln Mills
for the interpretation of contract terms in a 301 case was necessary to
foster a uniform national labor policy. But such is not the case when
only a procedural question such as the applicable statute of limitations is
involved. An instance could be conceived where a state statute of limita-
tion "unreasonably interferes with federal regulation of interstate com-
merce,"' 0 but such does not seem to be the case in Fischbach. The only
relevant question the district court should consider is which state statute
92. UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 1013 (1959); Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Union, 257 N.C. 18, 125 S.E.2d
277 (1962).
93. 198 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Calif. 1961).
94. Id. at 913. Cf. Kipbea Baking Co. v. Strauss, 218 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.
N.Y. 1963) where the court stated: "and it is well settled that state statutes cannot limit
the jurisdiction or restrict the procedure of the federal courts. .. ."
95. 333 U.S. 448 (1947). See also Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
96. See, e.g., Swick v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 68 F. Supp. 863 (D. Md. 1946), aff'd,
160 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
97. See, e.g., Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1962).
98. See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390
(1906) ; Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 293 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1961).
99. Holemberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). See also, Smith v. Cre-
mins, 308 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1962).
100. Davis v. Rockton & Rion R.R., 65 F. Supp. 67, 71 (W.D. S.C. 1946).
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of limitation provision to apply and not whether such provision applies. 1 '
In labor disputes, where officers are elected or changed frequently and
union members involved are likely to shift to new jobs, it is imperative
that some statute of limitations apply rather than the equitable doctrine
of laches."'0
Relation Between Court and Board
Although the conduct which gives rise to a section 303 action is, by
definition, an unfair labor practice, the Supreme Court ruled in Interna-
tional Longshoremnen.s Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp.' that a Board de-
termination of an unfair labor practice is not a condition precedent to re-
lief under section 303. The two actions are entirely independent, with
the court and the NLRB each entitled to make its own decision upon
the evidence before it. Such was the case in Juneau Spruce, where the
court affirmed a ruling by the NLRB that no unfair labor practice ex-
isted and, at the same time and on facts arising out of the same labor dis-
pute, affirmed a contrary ruling by a district court in a 303 suit. Both
the NLRB and the district court decisions were supported by substantial
evidence on the whole record of their respective hearings.' It seems
101. UMW v. Mfeadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52, 63 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. de-
nied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959). The court in Reliford v. Eastern Coal Corp., 260 F.2d 447,
455 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 958 (1959), stated:
Since the Congress embodied in § 301 .. . no statute of limitations, under the
established federal rule the appropriate state statute would in any event be ap-
plied. The District Court's error was not in applying the K-entucky statute but,
in our opinion, . . . in applying the one year limitation covering injuries to the
person rather than the 15 year limitation applicable to contracts."
See also Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1962), where the court in inter-
preting the federal Civil Rights Act, which had no statute of limitations, stated:
In determining which period of limitations to apply to an action under a particu-
lar federal statute the court accepts the state's interpretation of its own statute
of limitation, but determines for itself the nature of the right conferred by the
federal statute.
102. See generally, Note, 76 H-Iv. L. REv. 1306 (1963), for a discussion criticizing
the Fischbach decision.
103. 342 U.S. 237 (1952).
104. Compare NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953), with, United Brick Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198
F.2d 637 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952).
By determining that the Board and court are completely independent, special prob-
lems arise with regard to § 8(b) (4) (D) violations:
Section 8(b) (4) (D) gives rise to an administrative finding; § 303(a) (4) to a
judgment for damages. The fact that the two sections have an identity of
language and yet two different remedies is strong confirmation of our conclu-
sion that the remedies provided were to be independent of each other. Cer-
tainly there is nothing in the language of § 303 (a) (4) which makes its remedy
dependent on any prior administrative determination that an unfair labor prac-
tice has been committed. Rather, the opposite seems to be true. . . . The fact
that the Board must first attempt to resolve the dispute by means of a § 10(k)
determination before it can move under § 10(b) and (c) for a cease and desist
order is only a limitation on administrative power, as is the provision in § 10 (k)
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reasonable that the Juneau Spruce interpretation should prevail over an
interpretation requiring a Board determination first because a union is
more likely to refrain from unlawful activity if it is faced with the pos-
sibility of having to win both in the courts and before the NLRB rather
than just before the Board. This reasoning is consistent with the purpose
behind the enactment of section 303: to provide a further deterrent to
the proscribed activity. Proponents of a uniform national labor policy
will advocate that the Board always should decide the labor dispute in-
itially. The fear that a union will be caught in conflicting interpretations
of what constitutes a section 303 violation is, however, unfounded. De-
cisional law developed under section 8(b) (4) has been held to be con-
trolling in a private suit under section 303 since the violation of one is
theoretically a violation of the other.' Also, a court in a section 303
case may, if it so chooses, adopt by reference findings made by the NLRB
in the parallel unfair labor practice "cease and desist" case. No objection
can be made to this adoption so long as the findings are not treated as res
judicata."'0 In any event, the examiner's findings are some evidence of
fact, and weight should be given to them." 7  Besides being tied together
by decisional authority and prior findings in a pending case, the courts
will dismiss a complaint in which the defendant union had taken a posi-
tion diametrically opposed to the one which they persistently urged be-
fore the Board.0 8
There is one instance where the court must rely upon a prior Board
determination. A violation of section 8(b) (4) (c) 0 9 speaks in terms of
forcing recognition of a union where another has already been certified.
Recovery under 303 in the courts therefore depends entirely upon the
Board's determination of certification."' The issuance and revocation of
that upon compliance 'with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary ad-
justment of the dispute,' the charge shall be dismissed. These provisions, limit-
ing and curtailing the administrative power, find no counterpart in the provisions
for private redress contained in § 303 (a) (4).
International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 243-44
(1952).
105. Local 978, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Markwell, 305 F.2d 38, 40 (8th Cir.
1962).
106. Carpenters Union v. Cisco Constr. Co., 266 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1959).
107. Kipbea Baking Co. v. Strauss, 218 F. Supp. 696 (E.D. N.Y. 1963).
108. Ibid. See also NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963).
109. Section 8(b) (4) (C) provides that it is unlawful to induce or encourage em-
ployees or to threaten or coerce employers where the object thereof is "forcing or
requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as
the representative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the
representative of such employees under the provisions of § 9." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (1958).
110. Tungsten Mining Corp. v. District 50, 242 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1957).
NOTES
certifications of labor unions is entrusted expressly and solely to the
NLRB"' and rightly so with the uncertainty in future dealings that would
result when an employer had to deal with a union which was both certi-
fied and uncertified." 2
The Supreme Court, in considering whether courts should be per-
mitted to determine a union's certification, ruled that certification was
for the Board."' Reference was made to the Board's administrative
prudence in furthering industrial stability in such matters and the fact
that decertifying a defunct"4 or employer-dominated" 5 union is highly
discretionary. In any event, the language of 8(b) (4) (c) clearly re-
quires that any changes in certification must first comply with the pro-
visions of section 9,11' which sets forth Board procedure for determining
whether a union should be certified or not.
OBSERVATIONS ON CONDOMINIUMS IN INDIANA:
THE HORIZONTAL PROPERTY ACT OF 1963
As residential land-use in urban areas becomes more intensive to
house an expanding population, fewer families will be able to enjoy ad-
vantages of home ownership. The ownership in fee of individual apart-
ments in larger structures, as made possible in condominiums,' offers a
potential solution to that problem. The condominium is a new concept
111. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 404 (1940). It was
stated by the court in Pepper & Polter, Inc. v. Local 977, Automobile Workers Union,
103 F. Supp. 684, 688 (S.D. N.Y. 1952), that: "It must be presumed that the orderly
procedure contemplated by § 9 was intended as the sole and exclusive method of de-
certification." So a union cannot even voluntarily self-decertify itself. See Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 995, 996 (1945).
112. E.g., a certified union does not have to endure an election for a period of
time whereas an uncertified union is always subject to a management petition for an elec-
tion. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1958).
113. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96. 103-04 (1954).
114. Even though a certified union no longer functions nor represents a majority
of the employees, the certification still retains "vitality to protect an employer against a
raiding rival whose objective is forcing or requiring such employer to recognize or bar-
gain with it as the representative of his employees." Such remains the case until certi-
fication is effectively extinguished by Board action. Parks v. Atlanta Printing Press-
men Union, 243 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1957).
115. Lewis Food Co. v. Los Angeles Meat Drivers, 159 F. Supp. 763 (S.D. Calif.
1958).
116. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958).
1. The term "condominium" comes from the civil law and means literally "co-
ownership" in the sense of limited ownership. BLACK, LAw DICrONARY, 367 (4th ed.
1951).
